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tions. For those of us, however, who view the Constitution as more 
than an empty vessel into which personal preferences are to be 
poured-for those of us who join with Joseph Story in regarding the 
Constitution "as the truest security of the Union, and the only solid 
basis, on which to rest the private rights, the public liberties, and 
the substantial prosperity of the people composing the American 
Republic,"24 their understanding is profoundly mistaken. 
REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A 
THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
PROCESS. By Samuel Estreicher' and John Sexton.2 New 
Haven, Ct. and London: Yale University Press. 1986. Pp. x, 
201. $20.00. 
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. 3 
If Benjamin Franklin knew about modem policy analysis, he 
might amend his famous maxim to say that in this world nothing is 
certain but death, taxes, and unanticipated consequences. One of 
the substantial legacies of Chief Justice Warren Burger's tenure is 
an unanticipated (and to Chief Justice Burger probably unwelcome) 
consequence of his frequent contentions that our courts are 
overburdened.4 Professor Marc Galanter and others have re-
sponded with substantial empirical evidence that America really 
is not experiencing a "litigation explosion" with extraordinary 
caseloads, cost, and delay in the lower courts.s 
Chief Justice Burger's view that the courts are overloaded may 
have begun at home, for he consistently pointed to the Supreme 
24. I J. STORY, supra note 5, at 2. 
I. Professor of Law, New York University. 
2. Professor of Law, New York University. 
3. Professor of Law, Duke University. 
4. See, e.g .. W. Burger, Opening Remarks, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REMARKS 
AND ADDRESSES AT THE 63RD ANNUAL MEETING 3, 6-7 (1986). 
5. See Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); 
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes; What We Know and Don't Know (and Think 
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 
(1983). See also, e.g., Daniels, We're Not a Litigious Society, 24:2 JuDGES' J. 18 (Spring 
1985); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer, & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation. 31 
UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A PRELIMINARY Ex-
AMINATION OF AVAILABLE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TREND DATA IN STATE TRIAL COURTS 
FOR 1978, 1981, AND 1984 (1986). The questioning of the "litigation explosion" view has 
produced its own counter-literature. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS 
AND REFORM 63-65, 76 (1985); Marvell, There Is a Litigation Explosion, NAT'L L.J., May 
19, 1986, at 13. 
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Court's docket growth6 and called for measures to reduce the bur-
den on the Justices.7 As with the "litigation explosion" contro-
versy, his assertions have helped to inspire empirical work that 
strongly questions his premises. In Redefining the Supreme Court's 
Role,s which is for the most part a revised version of an earlier arti-
cle,9 Professors Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton (the latter a for-
mer Burger law clerk) argue that the Justices should begin by 
taking a cue from Pogo-"we have met the enemy, and it is us." 
Much of the difficulty, say Estreicher and Sexton, is that the Court 
simply takes too many cases; the workload crunch is primarily "a 
symptom of a different underlying problem-the lack of clearly de-
fined criteria to guide the Supreme Court's case selection." The au-
thors propose guidelines and reforms, most of which could be put 
into effect without legislation, to control the intake. 
The book develops a framework for analysis of the Court's cur-
rent problems and possible solutions, drawing on an extensive study 
of the Supreme Court's docket for the 1982 Term. The authors 
summarized their own argument so well in their earlier article that 
it seems better to quote than to attempt paraphrase: 
The problem, in our view, is not the Court's docket, but the unrealistic expec· 
lations that many, including the Justices, have for the Court in our society .... 
[G]iven the volume of litigation in our society today, and the pervasive role of fed-
eral law, the Supreme Court cannot act ... as the court of last resort in every case. 
The vision of the Court as an error corrector breeds frustration among those who 
are denied access to the Court despite their perception that error requiring review 
occurred. Furthermore, this vision burdens the Court with responsibilities and a 
projected caseload that it can never successfully shoulder, whether or not new 
courts are created. 
The creation of a new national court will not add to the capacity of the 
Supreme Court to decide cases because there is no reason to believe that litigants 
will accept the proposed court's resolution of their controversy. Indeed, a new layer 
of national review may exacerbate the problem by undermining the finality of the 
rulings of the existing circuit courts and by placing increasing pressure on the 
Supreme Court to review the nonfinal judgments of a court that purportedly speaks 
for the nation. 
In our view, the Court should act as the manager of the federal judicial system, 
overseeing the work of the federal and state courts, and intervening only when nec-
essary to resolve fundamental interbranch or federal-state clashes or to render a 
6. See, e.g., W. BURGER, 1984 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 6 (1985). 
7. See, e.g.. id. at 9-10; Burger, The Time Is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, 71 A.B.A. 
J. 86 (1985). 
8. The title and some other rhetoric, such as a subheading ("Recasting the Marbury v. 
Madison Model"), could misleadingly make some readers expect that the authors are ad-
dressing questions of the theory of constitutional decisionmaking. Rather, their focus is on 
docket handling and case selection, important problems in their own right but quite different 
and less cosmic. 
9. Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: 
An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 681 (1984). 
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final resolution of a question that has ripened for decision after percolation in the 
lower courts. 
Once one moves from the model of the Supreme Court as error corrector to a 
vision of the Court as manager, it becomes clear that the Court has the capacity to 
perform its essential functions, and more. What is needed is not an additional layer 
of nonfinal appellate review, but conscious management of the Court's docket and a 
managerial conception of the Court's responsibilities in the federal system. 
The authors' major premise, rejection of the individual-case 
"error correction" role for the Supreme Court, is-as they admit-
neither novel nor controversial, but it is in their view still insuffi-
ciently observed. From this premise they construct their "manage-
rial" theoryw and specific criteria for Supreme Court case selection. 
Using their approach, a simple two-circuit conflict usually would 
not mean review; more experience may be valuable when the Court 
ultimately resolves the conflict, or when a trend develops the maver-
ick circuit may rejoin the herd. 
Estreicher and Sexton develop a three-tier scheme, to whose 
details it is hard to do justice in a brief summary, distinguishing 
among cases whose review they regard as "priority," "discretion-
ary," or "improvident." The first category includes three-circuit 
and some other "intolerable" conflicts, but only if the petitioner has 
brought the conflict to the attention of the court below; cases in-
volving disregard of governing Supreme Court precedent; and ma-
jor federalism, separation of powers, and interstate disputes. The 
"discretionary" category includes cases presenting opportunities for 
advancing the development of federal law, some emergencies, occa-
sional correction of egregious error to keep lower courts in line, and 
some "structural" problems of federal court invalidation or state 
court upholding of state law. For the remaining cases, including 
most lesser conflicts or state court invalidation of state law on fed-
eral grounds, the authors argue that Supreme Court intervention is 
normally "improvident" as an unwarranted use of the Court's 
scarce law-making resources. 
Drawing on extensive reading of cases and materials from the 
Court's 1982 Term, the authors then evaluate the Court's perform-
ance by their criteria and find that nearly one fourth of the cases 
granted review were in the "improvident" category. II Law student 
10. Again, the authors' terminology might mislead some readers. Apart from being a 
response to caseload problems, their focus on case selection criteria and methods has little in 
common with the controversy over "managerial judging," which revolves around such mat-
ters as the sappropriate levels of pretrial involvement and settlement pressure by trial judges. 
See. e.g., Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376 (1982). 
I!. Significantly, they found apparent indulgence in mere error correction not to be a 
factor that seemed to explain a large number of their "improvident" grants, although it ac-
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researchers working on the project surveyed cases in which review 
was denied and found only about a third as many that qualified as 
"priority." These findings lead the authors to conclude that the 
Court has the capacity to fulfill its role and that a new tribunal is 
not the solution to the Court's workload problems.12 Instead, they 
suggest more careful case selection according to refined criteria, 
which would not only reduce improvident grants but also alleviate 
the Court's screening burden as attorneys learn which petitions for 
review are hopeless. 13 
The book is an important contribution to the debate over how 
to deal with the Supreme Court's workload. It particularly deserves 
attention for its careful argument for the unconventional view that 
at least at present levels of case flow, what the judicial system needs 
is not an additional level of review in some form but changes that 
the Court can implement by itself. The authors support their posi-
tion both by challenging the widely accepted premise that the 
Court's present workload requires additions to existing case-han-
dling capacity, and by pointing to some of the likely side effects of 
other proposals. For example, rather than reducing the Supreme 
Court's burdens by producing uniform rulings the Court would 
rarely review, more specialized courts or an Intercircuit Tribunal to 
counted for more than any other single source. Other major explanatory factors appeared to 
be mandatory review, correction of state courts' federal constitutional invalidation of state 
law, deference to the Solicitor General, and premature action to resolve conflicts. 
12. For a contrary view on the number and significance of unresolved circuit conflicts, 
see Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1406-
07 (1987). In large part, whether one accepts Estreicher and Sexton's evaluation of their data 
seems to turn on an assessment of the costs and benefits of "percolation" via disagreement in 
the lower courts. The authors argue that most two-circuit conflicts are tolerable because they 
are part of a process that produces more information upon which the Court can base a wise 
final resolution on the issue. Baker and McFarland reply, "Tolerating numerous conflicts 
under the rubric of percolation creates an incoherence and uncertainty in national law that 
results in serious inequities." ld. at 1409. In turn, one's view on the benefits of percolation is 
likely to depend on a judgment about whether conflicts tend to pose the kind of issues that it 
is most important to have simply decided-or if it is especially important that they be decided 
right. Cf Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) ("in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that 
it be settled right"). 
In this connection there is a good case for a distinction between constitutional and statu-
tory conflicts; Congress can readily eliminate the latter or correct what it views as a mistaken 
resolution by the Court. The importance and relative irreversibility of the Court's constitu-
tional interpretations, by contrast, suggest that some short-term nonuniformity may be a 
price more worth paying for a fully informed decision. After his often-quoted comment in 
Burnet. supra, Justice Brandeis excepted "cases involving the Federal Constitution, where 
correction through legislative action is practically impossible." I d. at 406-07. 
13. The authors also support the long-advocated abolition of the Supreme Court's 
mandatory jurisdiction, which my senior Senator (Jesse Helms) keeps blocking by attaching 
riders restricting jurisdiction over abortion, busing, or school prayer. Significantly, however, 
their research indicated that the mandatory jurisdiction is not a source of a large number of 
cases that they regard as unsuitable for the Court to review. 
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resolve conflicts might reduce the benefits of "percolation" and even 
require greater supervision by the high court. 
Estreicher and Sexton develop their own proposals with, for 
the most part, admirable thoroughness and care, especially in a 
book that remains quite concise (almost the last third of its 201 
pages consists of appendices and notes). Their extensive study of an 
entire Term's docket reflects an empiricism that is often rare in legal 
research. Yet some of their suggestions seem rather casual, ill-con-
sidered, or perhaps self-defeating. The proposal for a Supreme 
Court counterpart of new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, with 
Court-imposed sanctions for frivolous petitions, would probably 
create much work and strife; the Justices should not have to spend 
time deciding (and writing dissenting opinions about!) whether 
cases not worthy of review are frivolous or merely weak. The idea 
that the Court should establish an internal staff to take a "second 
look" at its own grants of review has been criticized, perhaps too 
stridently but with some justification, as "bizarre" and unlikely to 
work.I4 And the inclusion of "egregious error" as a ground for dis-
cretionary review could invite precisely the kind of individual-case 
error correction the authors criticize. 
Such unavoidable play in the joints and room to revert to pres-
ent problems raise a difficulty with one of the distinctive strengths 
of the book: the authors' primary reliance on action by the Justices 
themselves, rather than legislation, to carry out most of the sug-
gested measures. Disagreement over the particular form that a so-
lution should take can stymie Congress, even in the face of agreed 
need. Yet if, as the authors concede, the individual Justices' doctri-
nal agendas are a significant cause of "overgranting," the Justices 
themselves may be unlikely to reach (and maintain) an unstable 
equilibrium of mutual self-restraint. Successful abuse in the pursuit 
of ideological goals by one faction could lead to retaliation and 
breakdown. Estreicher and Sexton's own proposal is admirably 
lacking in political one-sidedness. In present circumstances it calls 
on "liberals" to accept some reduction in access to the Supreme 
Court, while also expecting "conservative" Justices to reach out less 
to correct "liberal" error in lower court decisions. But ineradicable 
ideological tensions could readily cause the deal to come unstuck. 
Ideology and resulting decisional trends may also collide with 
the authors' seemingly nonpartisan emphasis on getting the 
Supreme Court out of the business of routine error correction. That 
effort, however worthy in its own right, should not be pursued with-
out regard to how well the judicial system as a whole performs that 
14. Baker & McFarland, supra note 12, at 1411-12. 
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function. As Professor Preble Stolz has argued, there are good rea-
sons for being concerned about the state courts when it comes to 
correcting errors of federal law: 
The lack of effective supervision over state courts in their enforcement of fed-
eral law is much riskier than is the de facto final lawmaking power of the federal 
courts of appeals . . . . Numerous intangible factors tend to make federal judges 
loyal to the influence as well as the command of the Supreme Court. . . . In con-
trast, there is relatively little beyond the constitutionally required oath that binds 
the more than 200 state supreme court judges to the United States Supreme 
Court. 15 
Yet in the name of federalism, the Court in recent decades has 
often cut back on the extent to which federal lower courts can re-
view or forestall state court error on matters offederallaw.I6 When 
the Court construes narrowly federal habeas corpus and civil rights 
statutes allowing federal trial courts to enforce vital federal rights, it 
often leaves itself as the only available federal forum for the correc-
tion of possible state court error. Before the Justices or the rest of 
us accept any proposal to reduce further the extent to which the 
Supreme Court can correct error in individual cases, we should take 
into account how well the rest of the system protects litigants 
against error and injustice. 
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA. By Lee C. 
Bollinger1 New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 1986. 
Pp. 295. $19.95. 
James Magee2 
Nearly a decade ago, the highly publicized Skokie case 
presented one of the most dramatic and controversial free speech 
issues ever to arise in American courts. It involved an attempt by a 
few dozen members of the National Socialist Party to march 
through the streets of Skokie, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago inhab-
ited by some forty thousand Jews of whom several thousand were 
15. Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions on Federal Questions: The Need for 
Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 959-60 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
16. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (excluding fourth amendment claims 
from federal habeas review of state convictions in most cases); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971) (requiring more than irreparable harm for federal court to enjoin pending state crimi-
nal prosecution). 
I. Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware. 
